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NATO in transition
Justyna Gotkowska
The run-up to the celebrations of NATO’s 70th anniversary in London revealed a wide range 
of problems the Alliance is currently facing, starting with the differing narratives on trans- 
-Atlantic relations, the varying threat perceptions, insufficient political consultations on stra-
tegic issues, disagreements over defence spending, and ending with the question of leader-
ship. Given the increasing number of external challenges, diverging national interests and 
growing polarisation in internal policies, NATO member states find it more and more difficult 
to find common ground. At the same time, in the period of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, 
maintaining a functioning political and military alliance is still the best option for the United 
States and Europe alike. Thus NATO is about to enter yet another phase of adaptation. It will 
have to develop a new modus vivendi for better consultations and coordination concerning 
such challenges as Russia, China or terrorism. It is an open question what policy other NATO 
member states should adopt with regard to Turkey. A new military burden sharing is long 
overdue in order to better manage Europe’s collective defence on the eastern flank and crisis 
response in the southern neighbourhood. The European pillar in NATO needs to be strength-
ened and an intra-European ‘grand bargain’ in security and defence has to be found. This 
requires taking into account various perspectives on European security and launching a stra-
tegic dialogue between France, Germany and Poland, among others. A discussion is needed 
on how European military capabilities and policy coordination should be developed so as not 
to divide Europe and to strengthen the Alliance and relations with the USA without adversely 
affecting NATO and trans-Atlantic ties.
The differing narratives
Currently there are at least three contradictory 
narratives on the future of NATO and the West 
that function simultaneously in the transatlantic 
debates. The one that predominates in Western 
Europe, and is promoted by France but also pres-
ent in Germany, emphasises the US focus on the 
rivalry with China and claims that Washington is 
gradually withdrawing politically and militarily 
from Europe. President Trump’s recent decision 
to withdraw US troops from northern Syria vali-
dates this thinking. On the other hand, the nar-
rative of the eastern flank countries emphasises 
the return of the US to Europe and the unprece-
dented US political and military engagement in 
the region. This includes not only increasingly 
closer US-Polish military ties and strengthened 
Poland’s role as a Central European hub for US 
military operations on the entire eastern flank, 
but also the US exercise Defender 2020 with 
ca.  20,000 US Army soldiers being deployed 
from the continental US to Europe next year. 
In turn, US diplomats and analysts argue that 
Washington’s intention is to redefine the mili-
tary alliance with Europe without undermining 
it, as in a changed geopolitical environment the 
US is unable to engage both in crisis manage-
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 314 2
ment in Africa and the Middle East and in con-
taining Russia and China. Furthermore, in the 
US debates the problem of fighting and win-
ning two major wars at the same time (against 
China and Russia) is being raised.
These narratives, built also upon the national in-
terests, provide different answers about the fu-
ture of NATO. The US wants an alliance in which 
Europe would to a larger degree than before 
complement (or sometimes even replace) the 
US military presence in the European neigh-
bourhood (for example, in Syria), on the east-
ern flank and even in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Poland and other eastern flank countries want 
to keep, prolong and enhance the NATO and 
the US military engagement in Central Eastern 
Europe. France, in turn, strives for a European 
political, military and industrial autonomy in 
foreign and security policy under French lead-
ership and wants Europe to emancipate from 
the US. Germany is still aware of the US role 
in guaranteeing European security and hardly 
sees the French proposals to be in its interest, as 
they fail to take into account Central European 
perspectives and open the controversial ques-
tion of a European nuclear deterrence, among 
others. Germany is aware of the differing threat 
perceptions of the eastern and southern Allies; 
itself it does not really see a military threat com-
ing from Russia and feels endangered by Islamic 
terrorism coming from the South only to some 
extent. Nevertheless, Berlin wants to enhance 
European sovereignty in foreign and security 
policy in co-operation with Paris, but in a man-
ner that will not adversely affect NATO and the 
US security guarantees.
The varying threat perceptions
The deterrence and defence (complemented 
with elements of dialogue) vis-à-vis Russia has 
been in NATO’s focus since 2014, in line with 
the eastern flank countries’ threat perception. 
The Alliance has started to strengthen the col-
lective defence again by increasing allied mil-
itary presence in Poland, the Baltic states and 
Romania, among others. However, six years 
since the annexation of Crimea the analysis of 
threats and challenges in NATO is no longer so 
obvious.
Regardless of the US strong engagement in de-
terrence and defence measures on the eastern 
flank, Washington wants NATO to at least an-
alyse the challenges resulting from China’s in-
creasingly assertive and growing economic and 
military power. This also (or above all) relates to 
Chinese activity in Europe affecting broader secu-
rity. Hence, NATO defence ministers adopted in 
October 2019 updated baseline requirements for 
civilian telecommunications, including 5G, which 
signals a will to look for common ground on pro-
tecting critical infrastructure in Europe from Chi-
nese infiltration. At the same time, all this does 
not mean that NATO will become preoccupied 
with containing China in the future. The Allies 
are divided on the issue of how to shape poli-
cies vis-à-vis Beijing, and may end up (in the best 
scenario) better coordinating their actions on the 
national, EU and international level.
France presses on increased allied engagement 
in combating Islamic terrorism in Africa and 
the Middle East and is questioning the hith-
erto NATO consensus on Russia and, possibly, 
the common approach on China. In President 
Macron’s opinion, Russia is a potential strate-
gic partner for Europe, in combating terrorism 
among others, and China does not need to be 
perceived as a threat. In turn, Germany has be-
come convinced that it is necessary to maintain 
a limited deterrence and defence policy against 
Moscow (additionally strengthened by the US 
Currently there are at least three contra-
dictory narratives on the future of NATO 
and the West that function simultaneously 
in the transatlantic debates. 
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presence on the eastern flank), dialogue includ-
ed. However, Berlin does not see this as an ob-
stacle to pursuing the strategic Nord Stream 2 
gas pipeline project together with Russia. Chi-
na is a subject of heated discussions in Berlin, 
and it seems that only the next post-Merkel 
government will be able to develop a consist-
ent policy on Beijing. Crises and conflicts in Eu-
rope’s neighbourhood are viewed as an increas-
ing challenge in Germany, but Berlin has not 
reached a point in which political declarations 
translate into military engagement.
Turkey wants NATO to recognise the Kurdish 
groups in Syria as terrorist organisations and as 
a threat to NATO, since Ankara sees them un-
dermining the Turkish statehood. Furthermore, 
Turkey is not taking part in NATO’s deterrence 
and defence policy in the Baltic Sea region, is 
using the update of the eastern flank’s defence 
plans as a bargaining chip in the Alliance and 
is engaged in advanced military-technical co- 
-operation with Moscow.
The insufficient consultations
The tensions inside NATO linked to different 
threat perceptions are escalating also due to the 
lack of strategic allied consultations on issues 
vital for European security. The issue of uncoor-
dinated operations in northern Syria is the most 
striking example. Washington did not inform its 
European Allies beforehand on the decision on 
the withdrawal of the US troops, despite their 
close co-operation with the British and French 
forces in the theatre. However, it needs also to 
be mentioned that the US administration had 
been making unsuccessful efforts for at least 
a year to replace the US troops with European 
forces. After President Trump’s decision, Tur-
key launched an uncoordinated military offen-
sive in northern Syria targeted against Kurdish 
groups allied with the US. In this context, the 
German defence minister’s public proposal to 
set up a security zone in northern Syria without 
consulting NATO Allies first, seems to be less 
weighty. It was aimed rather at stimulating the 
domestic debate on military engagement in the 
European neighbourhood than provide a basis 
for serious talks with the Allies. Nevertheless, it 
caused some consternation inside NATO.
Meanwhile, the French President’s public pro-
posal on reopening a strategic dialogue with 
Russia without consulting the Allies is a much 
more serious illustration of the problem. Macron 
spoke about the need to revise the relationship 
between Europe and Russia since the European 
strategic autonomy, as desired by France, is only 
possible with a strategic partnership with Mos-
cow in place. Such a partnership would entail 
co-operation in combating terrorism, in resolv-
ing frozen conflicts, and would possibly mean 
withholding EU and NATO enlargement policy. 
The current French stance on reconsidering the 
Russian offer to introduce a moratorium on de-
ploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles – as 
a way of resolving the problem with the end of 
the INF Treaty – is also inconsistent with NATO’s 
agreed position. Macron’s proposals are not 
being considered by NATO, but they are under-
mining the allied consensus on policy towards 
Moscow.
The battle for money
The 2% of GDP defence investment pledge to 
be fulfilled by 2024 is inalterably on NATO’s 
agenda. According to the recent NATO defence 
expenditure data, in 2019 nine countries – the 
USA, Bulgaria, Greece, the United Kingdom, 
Estonia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland 
– spent 2% of GDP or more for defence. The 
total defence expenditure of European NATO 
member states (and Canada) has increased 
Six years since the annexation of Crimea 
the analysis of threats and challenges in 
NATO is no longer so obvious.
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to US$302 billion (in comparison with the US 
US$685 billion). There is a visible upward trend 
since 2014 and a recovery from the collapse 
caused by the financial and economic crisis in 
2008. However, twelve Allies (including Germa-
ny and Italy) still allocate less than 1.4% of their 
GDP on defence.
But not only defence expenditure matters. It is 
much more important how effectively national 
defence budgets are spent. They are in many 
cases not matched by relevant military capa-
bilities and militarily engagement in collective 
defence and/or crisis management. These seem 
to be more related to the understanding that 
military power is one of foreign and security 
policy instruments, to the political will to use 
the armed forces, to permanent operational 
engagement (including combat operations), 
streamlined modernisation process and reduc-
ing red tape. The best example illustrating this 
problem is Germany, which allocates 1.38% of 
GDP for defence, but nominally spends €47.8 
billion in 2019, i.e. more than France (€44.3 bil-
lion). And there is no doubt about the French 
military capabilities and engagement.
Germany has been the main object of President 
Trump’s criticism because the German econom-
ic power and significance in Europe is not re-
flected in assuming responsibility for common 
security. Ahead of the NATO meeting in London, 
Berlin made efforts to reduce the tension over 
this issue. The defence minister and CDU leader 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced that 
the German defence budget would be increased 
to 2% of GDP in 2031 (and to 1.5% of GDP in 
2024), which was confirmed by Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. Furthermore, Germany proposed 
a new cost-sharing formula on the contributions 
to the common NATO budget that is used to fi-
nance NATO infrastructure, including the head-
quarters in Brussels (a total of €2.12 billion in 
2019). Berlin committed to increase its annual 
contribution from 14.8% to 16.35% and pro-
posed to reduce the US share to the same level 
(from 22.1%). Thus, starting from 2021, Germa-
ny will be paying €33 million more, and the USA 
€120 million less. In effect, other Allies will have 
to fill the resulting gap of around €90 million. 
Paris, surprised by Berlin’s proposal, has already 
announced that it does not intend to pay more.
The imbalance of power inside NATO
The issues mentioned above are topped by the 
question of leadership in NATO, which compli-
cates relations and the balance of power inside 
the Alliance.
President Trump’s style of doing politics and the 
non-transparent decision making process add 
to the growing uncertainty in NATO. Moreover, 
the US has relinquished its active and construc-
tive role as NATO’s leader. The Trump adminis-
tration has given up building a consensus on 
such strategic issues as response to the rise of 
China and has attempted to impose the US pol-
icy on the Allies, which Washington is no longer 
capable of. The US diplomacy has also on many 
occasions seized to assume leadership in the 
NATO daily business. It has also become obvious 
that the Alliance is not functioning well with-
out proper US-German relations, which largely 
deteriorated under the Trump administration. 
However, this is not only Washington’s fault.
After 2014, Germany became a balancer be-
tween the eastern and the southern NATO and 
EU member states as regards the deterrence and 
defence policy, with a limited military engage-
ment on the eastern flank. It has also defended 
EU sanctions against Russia, at the same time 
opting for dialogue with Moscow. Germany also 
played a leading role in the Normandy Format 
talks aimed at resolving the Russian-Ukrainian 
war in Donbas, with a tacit support from the 
Not only defence expenditure matters – it 
is much more important how effectively 
defence budgets are spent. 
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Obama administration. However, the poor con-
dition of the Bundeswehr, the unwillingness to 
increase the defence spending and to enhance 
military engagement in collective defence or 
crisis management, coupled with the current 
political inertia have all caused Berlin to turn 
from a stabiliser of trans-Atlantic relations into 
another problem for NATO. It seems that it is 
only when the grand coalition ends, the pro-
cess of redefining German security and defence 
policy may begin, possibly by a new CDU/CSU- 
-Green coalition. A leftish government formed 
by the Greens, the SPD and the Left Party might 
however create completely new problems for 
the Alliance.
The United Kingdom also cannot be expected to 
assume the NATO leadership. London has been 
heavily engaged militarily both on the eastern 
flank and in the southern neighbourhood. How-
ever, since 2016 Brexit and the related domestic 
problems have excluded the UK from the real 
debate on both European defence and the fu-
ture of NATO.
This imbalance of power is being currently used 
by President Macron, who is fighting for French 
interests and French leadership in the European 
foreign and security policy. However, France has 
been inapt to build coalitions and winning allies 
by taking into account their security policy per-
spectives at least to some extent. Paris has not 
even tried to talk to Warsaw about the French 
visions of the European strategic autonomy 
complemented with future strategic dialogue 
and partnership with Russia. It even no longer 
coordinates its initiatives with Berlin – due to the 
perceived self-blockade of the grand coalition. 
The French ideas are therefore torpedoed not 
only for substance but also for style in Europe. 
Not only Poland and the eastern flank countries 
view them as harmful. Germany is also openly 
criticising President Macron’s ideas.
The future of NATO: “the reports of my 
death are greatly exaggerated”
The problems listed above are nothing new. 
The Allies have perceived threats differently, 
have pushed through various national goals 
and have consulted each other politically to 
a smaller and greater extent over the 70 years 
of NATO’s existence, in particular since the end 
of the Cold War. However, given the increasing 
number of external challenges, the differing na-
tional interests and the intensified polarisation 
in domestic policy, it is more and more difficult 
for member states to find common ground. 
At the same time, Europe is still the best political 
and military ally for the United States. It is not 
only because of allied political and military sup-
port for US operations abroad but also due to 
enhancing US global power projection through 
US military bases in Europe. For Europe the US 
remains the most important and irreplaceable 
ally for guaranteeing European security and for 
stabilising political relations between European 
states. Paradoxically, without strong relations 
with the US, Europe will not become more inte-
grated but rather more divided, signs of which 
are already visible. Thus, in the era of intensify-
ing geopolitical rivalry, maintaining a function-
ing political and military alliance is still the best 
option for all its members. However, this option 
requires political and military investments.
Firstly, this means resuming strategic dialogue 
on all threats and challenges: Russia, China 
and terrorism and elaborating a common un-
derstanding on how to tackle them. This re-
quires Washington’s political will, stable polit-
ical situation in the UK, a new government in 
Berlin, which will see the need and will be able 
to change German security and defence policy, 
a step-back from Paris and engagement from 
In the era of intensifying geopolitical ri-
valry, maintaining a functioning political 
and military alliance is still the best option 
for all its members.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 314 6
EDITORS: Wojciech Stanisławski,
Tomasz Strzelczyk, Szymon Sztyk 
TRANSLATION: Ilona Duchnovic
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities.
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: | +48 | 22 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
Warsaw. The launch of a reflection process to 
further strengthen NATO’s political dimension 
at the meeting in London might be a good start 
to resume such a dialogue.
Secondly, it is vital to reinforce the European 
pillar in NATO. This includes the long overdue 
redefinition of burden sharing with significantly 
enhanced European military capabilities and Eu-
ropean engagement on the eastern flank and in 
the southern neighbourhood, which has been 
discussed for years already. This gives rise to 
the fundamental question about how Europe-
an military capabilities and policy coordination 
should be developed so as not to divide Europe, 
and to strengthen the Alliance and relations 
with the USA without adversely affecting NATO 
and trans-Atlantic ties.  It will require greater 
German and French engagement on the eastern 
flank as well as German and Central European 
involvement in the southern neighbourhood. 
The European member states will have to find 
an intra-European ‘grand bargain’ in security 
and defence which may be executed in various 
formats – in the EU, NATO or multilateral ini-
tiatives. Such a ‘grand bargain’ will require, in 
particular, a strategic dialogue between France, 
Germany and Poland, the countries represent-
ing different perspectives on European security. 
To make it happen Paris needs to become open 
to the Central European threat perception (and 
vice versa) and Berlin has to intensify its military 
engagement abroad.
The most difficult challenge to resolve might be 
the internal one. It is an open question what 
policy other NATO member states should adopt 
with regard to Turkey questioning democracy 
and rule of law in internal policy, forcefully de-
manding recognition of its own security inter-
ests while establishing closer military-technical 
co-operation with a country whose aggressive 
actions are officially recognised as constituting 
a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. 
